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“The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose.”
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Philosophical Investigations, §127

οὐ γὰρ μόνον περὶ τῆς ὕλης δεῖ γνωρίζειν τὸν φυσικὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον, καὶ μᾶλλον (1037a15-17).
For the one who studies nature must know not only about the material but also about what is disclosed in speech, and even more
so.
Aristotle
Metaphysics (Trans. Sachs)
“Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language.”
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Zettel, §55
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In the early 20th century, philosophy underwent a “linguistic turn,” in which philosophy,
humanities, and even sciences made a redoubled focus on language itself. This turn was quite
comprehensive, focusing on nearly every aspect of language such as meaning, reference, truth
and falsity, logic, and the connection of language and reality. This renewed focus garnered a
significant amount of attention and thought in the 20th century by some of its most prominent
thinkers of both the analytic and even continental traditions. In the analytic tradition,
Wittgenstein, in his Tractatus, saw language as the logical limit of our known world, out of
which we cannot think, much less speak.1 In the continental tradition, Martin Heidegger
famously conceived of language as the “House of Being,” meaning that it stands at the very
foundation of how we conceive of our world around us and is the home in which we live.2
Language is perhaps the foremost medium through which one not only interacts with other
humans, but also frames and even conceives of the world. While the 20th century linguistic turn
ushered in a renewed focus on philosophy of language, these thinkers were not the first to
consider philosophical questions on language.
The earliest Greek thinkers and philosophers themselves were concerned with
fundamental questions of language.3 While the early 7th to 4th century Greeks did not have an
abstract word for language in the sense that we moderns do, they nevertheless questioned one of
the most integral parts of language itself: names.4 The earliest Pre-Socratics and even Sophists
questioned aspects of language, such as the significance of names and the relationship between

1

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (New York: The
Humanities Press Inc., 1961), 5.62
2
Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, trans. David Krell (New York, NY: Harper Collins Press, 1993) 213.
3
Paraskevi Kotzia and Maria Chrit, “Ancient Philosophers on Language,” in Encyclopedia of Ancient Greek
Language and Linguistics, 124.
4
By modern, abstract notion of language, I mean one in which language is viewed as the totality of words,
expressions, and modes of expression. The Greeks themselves did not have an abstract idea of language in its
totality, as we do today. The closest we get to a concept of language among the Greeks closest to our own is found
in Aristotle’s idea of λέξις; see Poetics 1450β.
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names and reality.5 These ancient arguments gained renewed significance when Plato
incorporated them into his own philosophy of names in the Cratylus.6 However, Aristotle’s
works, most notably his De Interpretatione, contain radical differences in key aspects of Plato’s
philosophy of names. This paper brings some of the critical differences of the two philosophers
on names to light. Specifically, I give an analysis of Aristotle’s philosophy of language,
especially for his concept of name (ὄνομα) from the first chapters of De Interpretatione,
demonstrates a departure from elements of Platonic philosophy of names in the Cratylus
regarding the origins of names, the significance of etymologies, and the ontological significance
of words.7 Regardless of whether or not Aristotle specifically had the Cratylus in mind when

5

Andreas Graeser, “On Language, Thought and Reality in Ancient Greek Philosophy,” Dialectica: International
Journal of Philosophy and Official Organ of the ESAP = Revue Internationale de Philosophie et Organe Officiel de
l’ESAP XXXI (1977): 360; One of the words the Pre-Socratics questioned was the Greek word λόγος and, through
this questioning, examined the relationship of discourse, speech, and language to the mind, world, knowledge, or
being (See Graham [2010]). The Pre-Socratics, Heraclitus most prominently in this regard, questioned what the
meaning of λόγος is (See Heraclitus DK 1, 2, 31, 39, 50, 72). A full, nuanced account of λόγος merits its own thesis
on account of its multi-varied meanings and uses. However, the focus of this thesis will primarily be on names
(ὀνόματα). λόγος itself never takes on an abstract meaning of “language,” as we understand it today. λόγος can refer
to “discourse,” “statement,” “word,” “reason,” “cosmos,” “thinking,” “expression,” “wisdom,” or “definition,”
among other meanings. While the argument can be made that λόγος means “language,” the primary focus of this
thesis is strictly with regard to names (ὀνόματα). However, it is important to note that, with this plethora of possible
meanings, λόγος is used in different contexts to convey different ideas, so one definition for such a multifaceted
word would be quite inadequate. In Plato and Aristotle, we see similar employment of λόγος in different contexts
without a universal meaning. Aristotle, in De Interpretatione, the Prior Analytics, and the Posterior Analytics, λόγος
is a statement, composed of names (ὀνόματα) and verbs (ῥήματα), that is a meaningful form of expression/speech
(σημαντικός) with λόγοι being a more general form of statement whereas the propositions of the demonstrative
sciences (προτάσεις) are only a subtype of λόγος (See De Int. 16b-17a, An. Pr. 24a, An. Post. 72a-b). Similarly, in
the Poetics, a λόγος is a compound (συνθετή) phrase/sentence, composed of words with independent meanings
(Poet. 1457a). However, in the Metaphysics and Nicomachean Ethics, λόγος is also something particular to the
human soul, traditionally translated as “reason” or, possibly, “capacity for speech” (Met. IX.2.1046a-b, NE
I.13.1101a-b). In the Phaedo, Socrates famously tells how he sought intellectual investigations beyond the senses by
taking refuge (καταφυγόντα) in λόγοι (Phaedo 99e-100a). In the Sophist, λόγος refers to statements/discourse that is
necessarily composed of nouns (ὀνόματα) and verbs (ῥήματα) (Sophist 262a-b). The meaning of λόγος, in short, is
quite varied for how each thinker employs it in certain contexts; however, in the Cratylus and De Interpretatione,
Aristotle and Plato share the notion that a λόγος is a complex statement that can express truth or falsity (Cratylus
385b-c, De Int. 16b-17a). Moss (2014) provides an excellent intertextual analysis of the meanings and nuances of
λόγος in Plato and Aristotle.
6
Ludovic De Cuypere and Klaas Willems, “Meaning and Reference in Aristotle’s Concept of the Linguistic Sign,”
Foundations of Science 13 (January 11, 2008): 308.
7
I would be remiss if I did not state the most evident difficulty in writing, analyzing, and presenting Platonic
philosophy: his dialogic form. In the Seventh Letter, in which Plato speaks in his own voice, he is incredibly direct
in asserting that he will never be a writer who dogmatically lists certain positions or points since the only real
understanding of the subject in question can only result from prolonged contemplation, exposure, and questioning of
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writing his De Interpertatione is irrelevant, for their diametrically opposing positions on these
aforementioned areas are quite striking. In addition, these differences, as I will show, are also
indicative of Aristotle’s overall philosophical disagreements with Plato, particularly his
modification and criticisms of the Platonic theory of forms and his emphasis on studying
empirical phenomena.
Chapter I: Origin of Names
§I.1.1: Plato on the Origin of Names in the Cratylus
Plato’s Cratylus is subtitled περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος or the “correctness concerning
names.”8 The dialogue’s primary arguments question how names acquire supposed “correct
status” in language. This notion of correctness (ὀρθότητος), although not as pertinent in
philosophy of language today, was an important question both during and prior to Plato’s life.
Plato’s predecessors, ranging from philosophers such as Democritus, Heraclitus, and Parmenides
to the sophists such as Gorgias and Protagoras, all comment on issues in names regarding its
connection to reality.9 Their foremost question was whether names are something natural (φύσει)
or established strictly by law/custom (νόμῳ) (383a4-383b7).10 Socrates’ interlocutors
Hermogenes and Cratylus embody the two diametrically opposed arguments in favor of

the subject (341c-d). This understanding of how proper philosophical contemplation occurs therefore informs us
why he writes in a dialogic form. Merely reading and memorizing dogmatic statements alone neither provides the
intellectual contemplation nor the satisfaction from proper philosophy. As a result, for this thesis, whenever I write
of Socrates, his interlocutors, or Plato holding certain positions, I refer to their positions within certain contexts in
the Cratylus itself. Since Plato writes in a dialogical form without he himself being present, there is a critical
quandary regarding interpretation: is Plato’s position Socrates’ and what are Plato’s actual positions? For more on
this issue of Platonic Anonymity and Plato’s voice in the dialogues, please see Edelstein (1962), Plass (1964), and
Cohn (2001). For this thesis, I will be considering the philosophical positions that Plato presents across the entire
dialogue and its intellectual progression. In accordance with scholars such as Sedley (1998) and Trivigno (2012), I
will be examining the Cratylus’ philosophical arguments as serious and neither facetious nor parodical.
8
Francesco Ademollo, ed., The Cratylus of Plato: A Commentary / [by] Francesco Ademollo (Cambridge ; New
York: Cambridge University Pr., 2011) 1.
9
De Cuypere and Willems, “Meaning and Reference in Aristotle’s Concept of the Linguistic Sign,” (2008), 309.
10
Ibid.; Rachel Barney, Names and Nature in Plato’s « Cratylus », Studies in Philosophy (London: Routledge,
2001): 50.
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conventionality (νόμῳ) and naturalism (φύσει) on this question, respectively. The purpose of this
section will be to provide an overview of how Plato considers both arguments on names and
ultimately arrives at an undetermined conclusion in the Cratylus. This framing will allow us to
more exactly ascertain Aristotle’s radical differences on names in language.
The Cratylus opens with Socrates and Hermogenes’ discussion concerning the
conventionality of names. Hermogenes argues:
ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὅτι ἄν τίς τῳ θῆται ὄνομα, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὀρθόν: καὶ
ἂν αὖθίς γε ἕτερον μεταθῆται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μηκέτι καλῇ, οὐδὲν ἧττον
τὸ ὕστερον ὀρθῶς ἔχειν τοῦ προτέρου, ὥσπερ τοῖς οἰκέταις ἡμεῖς
μετατιθέμεθα οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι ὀρθὸν τὸ μετατεθὲν τοῦ
πρότερον κειμένου: οὐ γὰρ φύσει ἑκάστῳ πεφυκέναι ὄνομα οὐδὲν
οὐδενί, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει τῶν ἐθισάντων τε καὶ καλούντων
(384d2-7).
I believe that any name you give a thing is its correct name. If you
change its name and give it another, the new one is as correct as the
old. For example, we give names to our domestic slaves, the new
ones are as correct as the old. No name belongs to a particular thing
by nature (φύσει) but only because of the rules (νόμῳ)and usage of
those who establish the usage and call it by the name (384d2-7).11
Hermogenes’ opening argument sets forth the primary dichotomous focus of the dialogue:
whether names are by nature (φύσει) or by law/custom (νόμῳ). In this case, Hermogenes sets
forth his view that words are merely arbitrarily designated to specific referents with no
underlying meaning in language. To this end, he even further cites how, since there exist a
multiplicity of languages and even differing Greek dialects, names must be relative and therefore
agreed upon strictly by agreement or custom (νόμῳ) (385e). Hermogenes’ argument suggests
that any person can attribute whatever name they want in language to any referent, thus creating

11

All translations of the Cratylus are from G.M.A. Grube.
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a private language.12 If I were to call a dog “X” or a house “C,” then such would be correct
according to Hermogenes’ thesis since I could call any entity by any name by my own
law/custom (385a6).13 In a more collective sense, names may be agreed upon by a larger
community, thus forming a convention of usage (συνθήκη) (384d1). Therefore, names, for
Hermogenes, are merely the result of an agreement or convention, thereby offering no sense of
intrinsic correctness or natural meanings.14 In response, Socrates is quick to advocate for the
naturalism argument. Instead of names being completely arbitrary, Socrates analogizes that just
as there are both virtuous/evil people, so too must there be a natural dichotomy of correct and
incorrect words (386d). When Hermogenes concedes this point, this gives way to Socrates’
subsequent naturalism counter argument.
Socrates critiques the conventionalist argument thoroughly. Some suggest that it is
indicative of Plato’s aversion to the implied relativism of Hermogenes’ claims.15 Socrates
suggests that naming itself is like a craft and just as a person who “cuts” something uses the
proper instrument “to cut in accord with the nature (κατὰ τὴν φύσιν) of cutting” (387α1-5). Since
any craftsman, such as a weaver or a driller, requires a proper tool to fulfill the nature of the
action, so too does naming require a proper, natural tool to be correct (387d-388c). Socrates
continues in suggesting that a “name...is a tool (ὄργανον) for giving instruction and for dividing
being,” just as a weaver’s shuttle divides “warp and woof” (388b10-c2). Since proper names
fundamentally distinguish the true being and nature of a given referent, names cannot therefore

12

David N. Sedley, Plato’s « Cratylus », Cambridge Studies in the Dialogues of Plato (Cambridge ; New York:
Cambridge University Pr., 2003): 53.
13
Richard J. Ketchum, “Names, Forms and Conventionalism. Cratylus 383-395,” Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient
Philosophy XXIV (1979):134-35.
14
For an alternative view, see Weingartner (1970).
15
Barney, Names and Nature in the Cratylus, 29.
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be arbitrary.16 On the contrary, just as a craftsman strives to encapsulate something naturally into
the being of the work, so too must a name be properly formulated in accordance with the nature
of its referent (389c). These names, Socrates continues, were the result of the original “rulesetters” (νομοθέται) whose actions encoded the essence of the referent into the structure of the
words themselves. This argument on the “rule-setters,” however, is entirely contingent upon the
premise that there is a kind of natural significance to names.17 Socrates notes the key task that
these rule-setters in language performed:
καὶ Κρατύλος ἀληθῆ λέγει λέγων φύσει [390ε] τὰ ὀνόματα εἶναι τοῖς
πράγμασι, καὶ οὐ πάντα δημιουργὸν ὀνομάτων εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνον
ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἀποβλέποντα εἰς τὸ τῇ φύσει ὄνομα ὂν ἑκάστῳ καὶ
δυνάμενον αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶδος τιθέναι εἴς τε τὰ γράμματα καὶ τὰς
συλλαβάς (390d5-390e2).
Cratylus is right in saying that things have natural names (τὰ
ὀνόματα εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασι), and that not everyone is a craftsman
of names, but only someone who looks to the natural name of each
thing and is able to put its form (τὸ εἶδος) into letters and syllables
(390d5-390e2).
This passage provides a two-fold clarification. First, it reveals that the original “rule-setters” of the
name looked to the form of the referent, whether sensible or immaterial, to encode it within the
structure of the word itself in its constituent letters (γράμματα) and syllables (συλλαβάς).18 Second,
this passage reveals how Socrates’ own refutation of Hermogenes is no different than Cratylus’
argument.19 This concession to Cratylus indicates that Socrates has essentially been detailing

16

Palmer, Names, Reference and Correctness in Plato’s Cratylus” 99.
Richard Robinson, “The Theory of Names in Plato’s Cratylus,” in Revue Internationale de Philosophie, vol. 9, no.
32 (2) (1955): 226.
18
Sedley, David N. “An Introduction to Plato's Theory of Forms,” in Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, vol.
78 (July 19, 2016).
19
Nancy H. Demand, “The Nomothetes of the Cratylus,” Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy XX (1975):
107.
17
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Cratylus’ own naturalism arguments during these previous exchanges.20 Following this
concession, the longest section of the dialogue, from 390e-427d, details Socrates support of the
naturalism argument by analyzing names of the heroes and the gods in the earliest texts of Homer
and Hesiod, in addition to other common Greek words like man (ἄνθρωπος), hero (ἥρως), and
being (οὐσία). We will return to this section in a subsequent chapter, for its etymological analyses
highlight the one of the foremost differences in Aristotle and Plato’s view on the significance of
onomastic roots. For our purposes, it is foremost to see how Socrates considers names, both proper
like Astyanax and common like ἄνθρωπος, to embody true imitations and representations of
referents’ essences (427c). If the name is indicative of the referent’s being (οὐσία), then it is
therefore the proper, true tool (ὄργανον) in language.21 For example, the name for the Greek word
name, ὄνομα, is correct according to Plato because ὄνομα refers to the adjective ὀνομαστόν (421a).
This adjective, ὀνομαστόν, is a compression of the phrase, “ὄν οὗ μάσμα ἐστίν,” or “being of
which there is a search” (421a-b). Ὄνομα is therefore correct because it denotes what a name does
and this true meaning is encoded into its constituent letters and syllables. Following this section,
Cratylus fully agrees and concurs with Socrates’s previous naturalistic account of language, going
so far as to call his account “entirely satisfactory” (428e2). Although it may seem like Socrates
and Cratylus have provided a comprehensive refutation of Hermogenes’ argument, the dialogue
does not end here.
Near the end of the dialogue, Socrates and Cratylus’ discussion reveals the foremost flaw
in the naturalism thesis. Specifically, if these primordial name-givers set forth names into language
which had not already existed, would their actions, at those historical moments, not therefore be

20

Bernard Williams, “Cratylus’ Theory of Names and Its Refutation,” in Language, ed. Stephen Everson, vol. 3,
Companions to Ancient Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pr., 1994), 28.
21
John V. Luce, “Plato on Truth and Falsity in Names,” Classical Quarterly XIX (1969): 225.
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indicative of a conventionalist theory of names (438b)? This insight raises a paradoxical point,
since it means that, while the οὐσία of the original referent was encoded into the name, the name
was nevertheless first set forth and agreed upon by a convention. Socrates’ provides the last
thought on this paradoxical situation in the whole dialogue, noting:
Since we agree on these points, Cratylus, I take your silence as a
sign of agreement, both convention and usage must contribute
something to expressing what we mean when we speak [...] I myself
prefer the view that names should be as much like the things as
possible, but I fear that defending this view is like hauling a ship up
a sticky ramp, as Hermogenes suggested, and that we have to make
use of this worthless thing, convention, in the correctness of names
(435b3-5, 435c1-5).
This passage serves as the conclusion of the Cratylus on the question of onomastic origins,
therefore ending the argument without any conclusive last word.22 Though Socrates reluctantly
concedes to the necessity of the conventionality argument, he seems to cling to his naturalism
thesis.23 As a result, Socrates holds that there is a twofold criteria for names: they must be
structurally similar to the referents in its constitution and must be externally agreed upon by
convention.24 Although the majority of this dialogue is aimed at ascertaining a more natural
understanding of names, the dialogue’s end hereafter (438c-440e) shifts and concludes with the
relationship of names and knowledge. Since the conventionalism argument puts all names in
perpetual flux and ever shifting with time, names are therefore improper for studying things
which are unchanging and permanent. As a result, Plato seems to believe that this issue of
onomastic origins and correctness has turned into an epistemological question; specifically, if

22

Barney, Name and Nature in Plato’s Cratylus, 130; for an alternative interpretation, see Kretzmann (1970).
Barney, Name and Nature in Plato’s Cratylus, 130; Ronald Levinson, “Language, Plato, and Logic,” The Society
for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter (January 1, 1955): 3.
24
Ibid, 130; Williams, “Cratylus’ Theory of Names and its Refutation,” 92.
23
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names are not reliable for knowledge of essences and forms, then what is?25 Since words may
not be truly indicative of the essences and forms of their referents, the interlocutors conclude by
agreeing that the forms themselves should be what is studied as opposed to the names since
forms are inherently unchanging and everlasting (438a-440s).26
Plato’s final argument in the Cratylus thus seems to be that since the origins of names are
necessarily determined by convention to a certain degree, they cannot be relied upon to ascertain
true natures or essences.27 Therefore, though some names may be indicative of a true essence of
its referent in its etymological components, thereby supporting the naturalism thesis, Plato
contends that the forms of the beings themselves are what ought to be studied, not names.28
§I.2.1: Aristotle on the Origin of Names in De Interpretatione
Although Aristotle does not refer to the Cratylus, his emphasis on the strict
conventionality of onomastic origins, in the opening chapters of De Interpretatione, marks a
departure from Plato’s contended origin of names. Whereas the Cratylus considers both the
naturalism and conventionalism argument equally, with the dialogue ultimately concluding with
an inconclusive synthesis, Aristotle dismisses any supposed naturalism of words, instead

25

Sedley, Plato’s Cratylus, 159.
Brian Calvert, “Forms and Flux in Plato’s Cratylus,” Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy XV (1970): 35;
J.V. Luce, “Plato on Truth and Falsity in Names,” 231; An issue that Plato does not seem to address in the Cratylus
is whether it is possible to arrive at knowledge of forms without the use of language as a guide. In his Seventh
Letter, Plato contends that there are three necessary aspects through which knowledge of something and,
consequently, its form is achieved, which, in order, are name (ὄνομα), account/definition (λόγος), and then the
image of it (εἴδωλον) (342a-b). However, in the Phaedo, Socrates and the interlocutors agree that the soul is able to
investigate and gain knowledge of the forms but there is no mention of names, definitions, or images being a
necessary component of that knowledge (79b-81a). Nevertheless, the account of the philosopher ‘s soul in these
passages of the Phaedo imply the necessity of language and discourse as the means through which one may think
(82c-85a).
27
Levinson, “Language, Plato, and Logic,” 3.
28
Unfortunately, Plato does not address, in the Cratylus, what the form of the name itself is. Socrates, however, does
assert that ὄνομα is an example of a word which is true by encoding a compressed statement which clarifies what a
name is and what it does. As we read previously, ὄνομα is the compressed statement “ὄν οὗ μάσμα ἐστίν,” meaning
“being of which there is a search” (421a). This statement is unfortunately the closest that the dialogue comes to
investigating whether the name of name itself (ὄνομα) is an example of a proper name and what that form of name
itself would be.
26
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adopting a strict conventionality (κατὰ συνθήκην). Moreover, unlike Plato, who perceives name
as an embodiment of a form set forth originally by brilliant name-giver, Aristotle ascribes the
origin of names in language to human agreement resulting from spoken utterances manifesting
the inner states of the soul, thereby removing any abstract idea of forms from the origin of
names.
To begin, Aristotle deals with the origin of language in his second chapter of De
Interpretatione in his definition of a name (ὄνομα). Specifically, he writes:
Ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ
χρόνου, ἧς μηδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν κεχωρισμένον (16a20-1).
A name (ὄνομα) is a sound (φωνὴ) that is significant according to
agreement (κατὰ συνήκην) without (indication of) time, of which
no part is significant when having been divided.29
This simple phrase “according to agreement” dismisses Plato’s arguments in the Cratylus with
one swift stroke by adhering to strict conventionalism. Moreover, Aristotle does not even
consider the possibility of there being a supposed “naturalness” in the construction of names in
language, whether in the whole word or in the parts of the word itself. Specifically, Aristotle
distinguishes between simple and compound names, writing:
οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἁπλοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐν τοῖς
πεπλεγμένοις • ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς τὸ μέρος σημαντικόν,
ἐν δὲ τούτοις βούλεται μέν, ἀλλ’ οὐδενὸς κεχωρισμένον, οἷον ἐν
τῷ ἐπακτροκέλης τὸ κέλης (De Interpretatione, 16a23-26).
Yet there is a difference between simple and composite nouns; for
in the former the part is in no way significant, in the latter it
contributes to the meaning of the whole, although it has not an
independent meaning. Thus in the word ‘pirate-boat’

29

Translation of this passage is my own; all bolded phrases and words in these sections are my own edits.
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(ἐπακτροκέλης) the word ‘boat’ (κέλης) has no meaning except as
part of the whole word.30
Compound words, as Aristotle suggests, are formed with existing words that have been
established by convention. Unlike Socrates’ and Cratylus’ naturalism argument, there is nothing
intrinsically true that corresponds to a form in the roots of simple words or in the constituent
letters. Even the words “pirate” and “boat” in the compound word “pirate-boat” are only
meaningful in the sense of the word “pirate-boat” when used together. The simple words have
inherently different meanings than the compound word, yet there is nothing significant or
meaningful about a word beyond the simple. These simple words are established by convention.
Since there is nothing significant in the word’s constituent parts, Aristotle, unlike Plato, does not
think that investigating word roots will be fruitful in an investigation of meanings. Aristotle’s
focus instead shifts towards how names become established by convention and how people name
things in the first place. Concerning convention, Aristotle elaborates further on the meaning of
κατὰ συνθήκην:
τὸ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην, ὅτι φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδεν ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽
ὅταν γένηται σύμβολον · ἐπεὶ δηλοῦσὶ γέ τι καὶ οἱ ἀγράμματοι
ψόφοι, οἷον θηρίων, ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν ὄνομα.
The (notion) according to agreement is such that there is nothing
(from) names that is “by nature” (φύσει), but (it is a name) only
whenever it becomes a symbol; the inarticulate (ἀγράμματοι)
noises (ψόφοι), the sort of which the beasts (make),
designate/indicate (δηλοῦσὶ), but it is not a name (ὄνομα).31
Aristotle makes two key points in these passages. First, he contends that words only have a
meaning when they become a unified σύμβολον or symbol, agreed upon by others. This
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σύμβολον serves as a conventional sign in conveying ideas, not necessarily in a one-to-one
correspondence nor in mirroring reality, but by obeying certain rules.32 Second, Aristotle, unlike
Plato, subtly indicates that there is a specific criterion necessary for something to be a name.
There are utterances (ψόφοι) which can indicate (δηλοῦσι) and make things known, but this is
not what a name (ὄνομα) makes known. We will return to this latter point in the subsequent
chapters, for this distinction of “inarticulate” and “articulate” sounds in De Interpretatione is
supplemented in the biological texts. This distinction, corroborated by the biological texts, will
serve as a refutation to Plato’s understanding of the elements of names such as letters, syllables,
and etymologies. For the time being, however, we shall focus on the former point on σύμβολον.
Aristotle’s understanding of σύμβολον here is not restricted merely to De Interpretatione, for he
defines the relation between σύμβολον and ὄνομα similarly across his corpus:
“but we use words (ὀνόμασιν) as symbols (συμβόλοις) in the place
of πραγμάτων” (Sophistical Refutations, 165a7-8).33
“for it (a proposition/λόγος) is composed out of names (ὀνομάτων),
and each symbol (σύμβολόν) is of names (ὀνομάτων)” (On Sense
and Sensibility, 437a15-16).34
Aristotle thus views the name as a written and spoken form of the σύμβολον. Moreover, it is
important to note that Aristotle views the concept of sign (σημεῖον) as interchangeable with
symbol (σύμβολον).35 In De Interpretatione itself, we can see how Aristotle refers to names as
symbols (σύμβολα) and signs (σημεῖα)(16a3-9; 16a15-19).36 This will become important as we
discuss Aristotle’s understanding of the symbol (σύμβολον) and its formation by the soul.
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To summarize Aristotle’s views, Aristotle conceives of the name (ὄνομα) as a symbol
(σύμβολον), agreed upon by convention (κατὰ συνθήκην), and with no part of itself being
significant (σημαντικὸν) when broken down to its parts, unless in the case of a compound word,
as we have previously seen. While Aristotle views the name as a spoken and written symbol
(σύμβολον) agreed upon by convention, he views the origin of the symbol in language as a result
of an affection of the soul (παθήμα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ), or something either external or internal affecting
the soul. The opening passage of De Interpretatione provides further clarity on this point:
ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα,
καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πᾶσι
τὰ αὐτά. οὐδέ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί · ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτων,
ταὐτὰ37 πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα
πράγματα ἤδη ταὐτά. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ
ψυχῆς· ἄλλης γὰρ πραγματείας.
Now spoken sounds are symbols (σύμβολα) of affections in the soul
(ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων), and written marks symbols of spoken
sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men,
neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs
(σημεῖα) of – affections of the soul (παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς) are the
same for all (ταὐτὰ πᾶσι); and what these affections are likenesses
of – actual things (πράγματα) – are also the same. These matters
have been discussed in the work on the soul and do not belong to the
present subject (De Interpretatione, 16a3-9).
This opening passage is arguably the most famous of the whole treatise.38 Kretzmann goes so far
as to call it the “most influential text in the history of semantics.”39 While it is famous, it is
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nevertheless incredibly brief.40 As such, it is quite “rich” yet simultaneously “puzzling.”41 Its
brevity, however, provides a dense amount to unpack in Aristotle’s understanding of the origin
of language and semantics. Specifically, while Aristotle contends that names are arbitrarily
imposed by convention, their referents are the vocalizations (ἐν τῇ φωνῇ) caused by the
affections (παθήματα) upon the soul (ψυχῇ). This affection is something that is the same for all
people(ταὐτὰ πᾶσι) while the vocalization and writing signifying the name would be what is
inherently different. This connection to the soul and the internal is quite remarkable, for Plato,
nowhere in the Cratylus, draws such a connection between names and thoughts or names and
soul.42 As we saw previously, the names are never discussed in the Cratylus in relation to any
internal processes but only in relation to the forms or the beings they refer (421a). Nevertheless,
Aristotle’s allusion to περὶ ψυχῆς, or De Anima, is quite problematic for modern interpretations
and arguably the most difficult passage in De Interpretatione, since many scholars have sought
to draw parallels to De Anima itself.43 Looking within De Interpretatione, we can see that
Aristotle views the affections of the soul as impressions of things in the world (πράγματα). In the
former sense, Aristotle views the souls’ affection from a πράγμα as an inherent likeness
(ὁμοίωμα) of that very πράγμα. This is another key point of departure from Plato. Whereas there
is a consensus in the Cratylus that names are imitations (ἀπομιμούμενοι) of the referent,
Aristotle contends that the only kind of “imitation” is that of the affection of similar “likenesses”
(ὁμοιώματα) upon the soul (427c-d). This affection and state of the soul, as previously stated,
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seems to be what is universal for all people (ταὐτὰ πᾶσι) while the conventional symbol and
thought are what differs.44 Whatever one’s language may be, Aristotle contends that these
impressions of the world all affect and impress upon the soul in the same way, albeit actualized
in different linguistic manners.45 However, Aristotle does not restrict affections of the soul
strictly to external phenomena, for he connects παθήματα to thoughts (νοήματα) as well.
Specifically, he writes:
Ἔστι δέ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ ψυχῆ ὁτὲ μὲν νόημα ἄνευ τοῦ ἀληθεύειν ἢ
ψεύδεσθαι, ὁτὲ δὲ ἤδη ᾧ ἀνάγκη τούτων ὑπάρχειν θάτερον, οὕτω
καὶ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ (De Interpretatione, 16a10-12).
As there are in the mind thoughts which do not involve truth or
falsity, and also those which must be either true or false, so it is in
speech.
This passage directly follows the passage in which Aristotle first mentions “affections of the
soul.” This has led some scholars to view Aristotle as drawing a direct parallel between
παθήματα and νοήματα.46 By connecting παθήματα to νοήματα, affections of the soul ultimately
refer not only to the impressions from external things on the soul, but also internal impressions,
whether mental or abstract. Nevertheless, however, Aristotle stresses that the genesis of a name
in language is strictly a result of agreement.47 Aristotle does not hold that certain phonemes or
utterances are intrinsically connected to some essence or higher form.48 Across languages, names
of the same referent will ultimately refer to the same being.
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In tracing Aristotle’s understanding of ὄνομα, we can more succinctly approach
Aristotle’s theory of signification with this diagram:

πράγματα
(Things in the
World)
&
νοητά
(Thinkable Things)

παθήματα τῆς
ψυχής
Affections of the
Soul
(Internal/External)

σύμβολα
(Symbols as
Spoken Words)

ὀνόματα
(Written Word [τὰ
γραφόμενα] {these
can also be
spoken})

By looking at Aristotle’s theory of signification in this way, we can more directly
contrast Plato and Aristotle’s understandings of onomastic origins. Whereas Plato contends that
the name, if it is not to be merely a conventional agreement, bears its originary meaning from a
primordial name-giver or form, Aristotle traces the origin of name’s original imposition into
language to the “affections of the soul." For example, given the multiplicity of names for
concepts, both physical and mental, across different languages with words such as “apple” or
“anxiety,” Aristotle would contend that these varying significations have the same affection in
the human soul as its primary source.

I.3.1 Summary of Chapter I
Instead of ascribing the origin of words to some mystical name-giver or supposed
naturalness, Aristotle describes words solely in relation to the “affections of the soul” which then
become actualized in speech and agreed upon by convention. This places the emphasis of origin
strictly on human affairs as opposed to some greater entity or causality. Aristotle’s answer to the
question of “correctness of name” (ὀρθότης τῶν ὀνομάτων) is that such a names can never arise
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universally on account of the multiplicity of languages and the strict conventionalism of words,
both spoken and written.49 Instead of looking to the forms themselves for clarity on the names,
Aristotle instead looks to the human soul and emphasizes that it is strictly how worldly
phenomena (πράγματα & νοήματα) act upon the soul that gives rise to language itself. However,
this shift in Aristotle seems remarkably similar to Plato’s conclusion in the Cratylus that
ultimately asserts the forms are the beings to be studied since they are universal and unchanging
as opposed to names. Nevertheless, this juxtaposition of both Plato and Aristotle’s thoughts on
the origin of language, though contrary, highlights this fundamental departure which Aristotle
makes from the more ideal elements of Platonic philosophy.

Chapter ΙΙ: The Elements of Names
49

Arens. Aristotle’s Theory of Language and its Tradition, 28

Blain 21
II.1.1: Plato on the Correctness of Letters and Syllables
The most extensive portion of the Cratylus details a thorough investigation into the
nature of etymologies of names in addition to their constituent syllables, and letters (390e427d).50 Plato puts forth arguments in the Cratylus which suggest that names themselves can be
naturally significant when we look to their constituent etymologies and, beyond this, to the
onomatopoetic meaning of a primary, non-compound word’s constituent sounds and letters.
Specifically, Socrates and Cratylus cause Hermogenes to concede that, unlike the strict
conventionalism for which he initially advocates, names cannot be formed by mere
happenstance. In this first section of chapter II, we will investigate how Socrates’ interlocutors
in the Cratylus advance a twofold theory of natural names which suggests that the constituent
letters/syllables and etymologies of words can be used to ascertain whether or not the word in the
language is correct or not.
Despite being the most elementary units composing words, letters themselves, Plato
suggests, maintain an individual meaning that contributes to the overall nature of the word itself.
The meaning of the letter and its accompanying phoneme maintain an onomatopoetic being that
captures of the essence of the referent in the primary name.51 By primary name, I mean ones
which are the integral words used in compound words and beyond which there can be no further
deconstruction unless in the form of its integral letters and syllables (422a)52. These primary
names, at least the true ones, are therefore “expertly” crafted by the name-givers and require
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thorough investigation to ascertain their essence.53 For these names, Socrates asserts that the
name-givers encoded the form (εἶδος) of the referent into its constituent syllables (συλλαβαί) and
letters (γράμματα)(390α). Analogously, Socrates suggests that just as a painter finds the correct
colors with which to capture his or her subject, so too did the original name-giver in language
consult the correct individual letters in order to capture the nature of the referent in the individual
letters (424e). This kind of analogous thinking hearkens back to Socrates’ shuttle simile wherein
he contends that just as a shuttle is used for its proper task of weaving, so too is the name used
for the proper naming task (387d-388b). Just as a weaver uses the appropriate fabric with the
shuttle for making garments, the name-giver encodes the name with the proper letters necessary
to represent its εἶδος intrinsically.54 The correctness of the individual letter, therefore, is
predicated on how the original name-givers understood that there was an intrinsic onomatopoetic
essence inherent in the letters themselves. Letters such as lambda (λ), rho (ρ), and nu (ν), in
addition to the other Greek letters, are used to represent varying meanings in their words in
which they are used (426c-427d). By breaking down various primary names into their constituent
letters, Socrates believes that they can then ascertain exactly how the ancient name-givers
encoded ideas through the appropriate letters with their voices into the primary name (423c425b). On account of the many examples that Socrates employs in this section, I have organized
the overall argument with the following chart, which helps categorize and frame what Socrates
and Hermogenes mean on this point:

Letter

53
54

Examples

David Sedley, “Etymologies in Plato’s Cratylus,” 141.
Ibid., 88-89.

Intrinsic Meaning of the
Letter
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Rho (ρ)

Lambda (λ)

Nu (ν)

ῥοή (river)
ῥεῖν (to flow)
τρόμος (trembling)
τρέχειν (to run)
κρουειν (to strike)
θραύειν (to shatter)
ἐρείκειν (to pound)
θρύπτειν (to break)
κερματίζειν (to cut up)
ὀλισθάνειν (to slip/glide)
λεῖα (smooth)
λιπαρόν (greasy/sleek)
κολλῶδες (viscous)
ἔνδον (within)
ἐντός (inside)

Captures idea of motion and
flowing in addition to
action(426d-e)

Resembles the gliding and
smoothness of the tongue in
forming the sound “λ”
(427b1-5).
Since “ν is an “inward
sound,” it is used for
indicating things inside
(427b8-c1).

These letters, the motions used to indicate them, and their inherent phoneme are what therefore
constitute their intrinsic meaning. As a result, letters are onomatopoetically and mimetically
similar to an idea that is then encoded into a word expressive of that idea in some degree.55This
intrinsic onomatopoeia and mimesis is not restricted to individual letters, however, for Socrates
and Hermogenes also include compound syllables and diphthongs as similarly expressing some
idea in their referents. One of these compound syllables is the Greek letter psi (ψ) [combination
of pi (π) and sigma (σ)]in the word ψυχρός (cold/chilly) with the psi (ψ) indicating the expulsion
of breath associated with shivering (427a). These considerations of letters and compound
syllables in these sections serve the purpose of demonstrating how exactly the name-givers were
able to encode the exact form (εἶδος) into the name (ὄνομα) itself, thereby allowing the mere
utterance of the name to impart an exact delineation of the being (οὐσία) of the referent (423e).56

55
56

Sean Driscoll, “Linguistic Mimesis in Plato’s Cratylus,” 116
Gail Fine, “Plato on Naming,” 298; Sedley, Plato’s Cratylus, 150.

Blain 24
The primary name, however, can only be examined once it has been either extricated as
an element from a compound word or as an etymology of word. Socrates contends that the Greek
word for name itself, ὄνομα, is a kind of compressed statement, specifically a condensed form of
a phrase. Ὄνομα itself, Socrates suggests, is the condensed phrase ὂν οὗ μάσμα ἐστίν or “a being
of which there is a search” (421a9-10). The constituent elements in the condensed phrase
thereafter could be likewise broken down into its parts as well. Recognizing the possible infinite
regress, however, Socrates suggests that they only approach the names that are elements of
others (στοιχεῖα τῶν ἄλλων) (422a1-5). Only then is it germane to investigate the nature of
letters and primary names. It is interesting to note that before even discussing the nature of letters
and primary names, Socrates and Hermogenes first dissect words for their etymologies as a first
criteria of correctness.57 As we shall see, this first criterion of correctness will prove the most
exhaustive in the whole dialogue.
II.1.2 Etymologies in Plato’s Cratylus
The interlocutors find that the letters and syllables, with their encoded meanings, are
what the original name-givers employed in the formation of the primary names. However, a
primary name can only be ascertained, let alone analyzed, when it has been reduced to a primary
name by dissecting compound words or etymologies. It should be noted that Plato does not use
the word etymology (ἐτυμολογία) in either the Cratylus or any of his extant dialogues. The
earliest usage occurs roughly seventy years after Plato’s death by Philo of Alexandria.58
Nevertheless, this investigation into an extensive amount of subjects and words reveal what
etymological investigations, especially among sophists in 5th—4th century B.C.E., consisted.59
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Moreover, we will be following the tradition of other scholars who similarly refer to this section
as the etymological section. Before Socrates and Hermogenes even discuss letters and syllables,
they first discuss the nature of etymologies in words, which, they believe, are correct only when
the etymology is indicative of the referent’s essence (397a-c). As with the section on letters, I
have provided a chart which details some of the words Socrates and Hermogenes analyze in their
discourse:
Greek Word

Contended Etymologies

Ζεύς
Zeus [396a-b]

δι᾽ ὃν ζῆν

ἥρως
hero [398d]

ἔρως

Ἀστυάναξ
(Astyanax) [392b-e]
ἄνθρωπος
(man) [399c]
Ψύχη
(soul/spirit) [399d-400c]
Φρόνησις
(wisdom) (411d-e)
Νόησις (understanding/intelligence)
(411d)

ἄστυ + ἄναξ
ἀναθρῶν ἅ ὄπωπε
ἣ φύσιν ὀχεῖ καὶ ἔχειà φυσέχην
Φορᾶς ῥοῦ νόησις
Νέου ἕσις

Meaning of the Etymology
cause of life (114)
[Literally: one account of whom to
live]
Love (Since heroes are demigods
and therefore born from the
love/lust between humans and gods)
Master of the city60
one who observes closely what he
has seen (118)
Nature-sustainer (118)
understanding is of flow and
motion”
an aiming at the new

In the chart, I sought to capture the broad scope of the kinds of names which Socrates and
Hermogenes investigate: divinities (θεοί), daemons (δαίμονες), heroes (ἥρωαι), and then humans
or human virtues or attributes (ἂνθρωποι) (397d). The terms provided above are by no means,
therefore, exhaustive of Socrates and Hermogenes’ full discourse. Their investigations analyze a
rather comprehensive list of names, covering the names of the Homeric heroes (e.g. Astyanax
and Hector), gods (e.g. Zeus and Poseidon), elements (e.g. fire, air, water, earth,), virtues

60
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(courage, justice, wisdom), and additional philosophical terminology (390e-421c).61 That being
said, this chart provides a cursory overview of how Socrates’ interlocutors, and Plato by
extension, understand what an etymological analysis requires. Following the etymological
section, Cratylus and Socrates discuss whether it is possible for some names to be more correct
than others, leading them both to the more important question of how much conventionalism
attributes to the meaning of words (431a-440e). Cratylus’ objects to Socrates that there are some
names that are less correct than others insofar as there are primary names, such as σκληρός
meaning “hard” which do not, by their constituent letters such as lamda (λ), embody the very
idea to which they refer (434b-e). Socrates reluctantly concedes that this entire previous
naturalism argument of names would ultimately be unsatisfactory since it seems necessary that
agreement and convention must have some role in word veracity:
I myself prefer the view that names should be as much like things
as possible, but I fear that defending this view is like hauling a ship
up a sticky ramp, as Hermogenes suggested, and that we have to
make use of this worthless thing, convention, in the correctness of
names (Cratylus 435c1-5).
The dialogue ends without a singular conclusion since the final conversations between Socrates
and Cratylus question the worth of studying names at all.62 Instead, Socrates contends that the
study of the form (εἶδος) to which the name corresponds is what should be investigated since it is
better to learn from the original than a mere imitation or representation of something (438e439b). Since names must change over time due to the shifting nature of conventions and usage,
their imitation of the form, not matter how accurate, would therefore shift and possibly become
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false over time. Socrates therefore views names as being inherently unreliable since they can
possibly deceive language users on the correct nature of the referent.63 Despite the thoroughness
in this etymological argument for the naturalism thesis, Socrates’ interlocutors, become
conflicted between the two theses, ultimately concluding the dialogue by stating that they should
merely study the forms to which the words refer since they are inherently unchanging and
knowable. As a result, forms are immune to the vicissitudes of linguistic convention.64 Although
we will investigate this idea in more detail in chapter three, it is important to note here that
Socrates nevertheless clings to a hope for the naturalism thesis in spite of Cratylus’ objections
and this shift towards the forms themselves.
§II.2.1 Aristotle on the Biological Basis of Noise, Voice, and Speech Production
As we found in the previous chapter, Aristotle explicitly asserts that names (ὀνόματα) are
merely sounds (φωναί) that are significant according to agreement (κατὰ συνήκην) without any
part of themselves being significant when having been divided (De Int. 16a23-26). Whereas
Socrates’ interlocutors in the Cratylus argue that there are intrinsic meanings behind specific
etymologies, letters, and even phonemes, Aristotle dismisses such notions with one Alexandrian
stroke in De Interpretatione.65 While Aristotle scarcely develops this point further in De
Interpretatione itself, his overall sentiment in those brief passages parallels similar observations
on words found in his biological texts, particularly his De Partibus Animalium and Historia
Animalium. The purpose of this section will be to focus on Aristotle’s views on the elements of
words themselves in his biological texts. More specifically, Aristotle puts forth, in De Partibus
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Animalium and Historia Animalium, a twofold argument that contends, first, that all letters or
utterances are merely a consequence of our anatomy; and second, that the ability to produce
speech is merely a biological attribute, with humans having the highest abilities to express their
reason through language, thereby communicating in a manner far more advanced than any other
animal.66 If the ability to produce speech is merely biological and our languages are all
conventional, then this removes any sort of mystic, primordial, or divine quality in the nature of
our words, letters, or etymologies. In studying these twofold arguments, we can better approach
another fundamental difference in the philosophies of language of Plato and Aristotle: studying
biological phenomena on behalf of philosophical questions.
§II.2.2 Letters in Language as a Result of Anatomy
To begin, whereas Socrates and Cratylus view specific letter/phoneme connections as
having a natural meaning to them, thereby explaining their inclusion in the makeup of a word,
Aristotle would dismiss such a notion.67 Instead, Aristotle suggests that all words, no matter how
elementary the utterance’s syllables or individual phonemes, are merely a result of the biological
limitations of our tongue, mouth, facial muscles, and respiratory systems. Therefore, any
meaning associated with such a letter/phoneme would only be so according to a convention. As
we found previously, Aristotle states that all humans have the capacity for discourse
(διάλεκτον/λόγος); however, this capacity manifests itself across the multiplicity of languages. In
Partibus Animalium, Aristotle writes:
“Now vocal speech (λόγος ὁ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς) consists of
combinations of the various letters or sounds, some of which are
produced by an impact of the tongue, others by closing the lips;
and if the lips were not supple, or if the tongue were other than it
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is, the greater part of these could not possibly be produced (660a27)”.68
What is interesting to note here is that Aristotle’s classification of vocalized letters and their
production roughly corresponds to the modern linguistic classifications of letter formation, for
example, dentals (tongue-teeth), labial (tongue-lips), and palatal (tongue-palate) letters.69 With
such a finite oral anatomy, humans are therefore quite limited in the sounds we can possibly
make. In addition to a pliable tongue and solid teeth, Aristotle also notes that humans are unique
in having some of the softest lips of any animal (PA 659b25-30). Unlike other animals whose
lips are primarily for the protection of the teeth, human lips serve the higher function of clear,
articulated speech by allowing for easy separation, movement, and formation with the lips (PA
629b35-630a5).
In addition to oral anatomy, humans also require a dynamic respiratory system, through
which the inhaling and exhaling of air through the vocal chords directly produces the vibrations
and sounds that become voice.70 Sound can be produced by simply striking two objects together
to produce vibrations; however, Aristotle specifies that the capacity to emit voice (φωνή) is
specifically a quality only of animate beings with lungs, windpipes, pharynxes, and all the other
respiratory organs (HA 535b13-15; DA 420b). With the abilities to breathe and produce sound
through the vocal cords, and maneuver the lips and tongue at will, humans possess the unique
ability of articulation (διάρθρωσις; lit: “through jointedness”) with which to form specific sounds
and utterances corresponding to other ideas.71 The combinations of those finite “articulations”
allow for the ability to convey complex ideas through language.72
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Since nature always acts according to a specific, realized end (τέλος) according to
Aristotle, it was not merely by accident that humans have the most well-developed abilities for
vocal communication or speech relative to all other animals (Phys. 199a-200b).73 Instead,
Aristotle argues that the amalgamation of advantageous organs, systems, and a capacity for
communication unlike any other animal causes human language. As a result, Aristotle therefore
removes any notion of divinities, name-givers, or ancient peoples in ascertaining the genesis of
names, ascribing its development merely to biological phenomena. Although humans naturally
have the anatomy for articulating finite letters and noises, that fact does not imply that these
sounds would have any intrinsic, semantic meaning. There are only a certain number of specific
sounds which we can make with our respiratory and oral anatomy, which, if such limitations
were removed, would allow for an infinite variety of sounds to be produced.74 Just as Aristotle
contends that names (ὀνόματα) have no meaning apart from their unity and agreed-upon
meaning, so too does he assert that the finite letters, which we can vocalize, maintain no intrinsic
meaning.75 Aristotle ascribes this lack of intrinsic meaning to the great diversity of languages.
The physiological limitations from which humans can produce articulated sound provide
the basis not only for human language itself, but also the great multiplicity of languages.
Aristotle notes that humans are quite unusual compared to other animals in that:
καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι φωνὴν μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ἀφιᾶσι, διάλεκτον δ᾽οὐ τὴν
αὐτήν (HA 536b19-20).
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Men have the same voice the world over, but different varieties of
speech.76
All humans have a capacity for expression with a voice but our language is inherently local,
thereby giving rise to its great diversity. Aristotle similarly expresses this sentiment in his
Problems, questioning why humans have such diverse forms of discourse and languages while
there seem to be no animals with any sort of equal diversity.77 Whereas certain animals can only
indicate with two or perhaps three different tones, humans have the abilities of complex
expression, actualizing in the near unlimited variations of letters and, by extension, languages
across the world.78
This thinking in the biological texts mirrors his thoughts in De Interpretatione quite
strikingly. Just as humans have the same experiences in mental processes and affections in the
soul (παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ), so too do humans have a universal ability to produce a voice, both
of which culminate in languages unique and diverse to their communities.79 Although humans
may have the same affections in the soul (παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ), the symbol which various
people use for that mental impression nevertheless varies across all different language.80 The
mere fact that humans have a universal anatomy or mental experiences does not ultimately imply
that there would be a preordained meaning in each letter, phoneme, or word. If there is to be an
“intrinsic” meaning in words, it ultimately rests not with its constituent letters, syllables, and
phonemes, but in the universality of the human affections of the soul upon which phenomena act.
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From these passages, we can see how Aristotle is much more cognizant of the great
multiplicity of languages. This cognizance informs how he views the inherent conventionality of
words and, consequently, its lack of a supposed universal, divine meaning in a Platonic sense.
Letters and syllables result from the biological organs, with any supposed intrinsic meaning
being a mere consequence of conventional agreement by local communities.81 Aristotle would
therefore view Plato’s suggested onomatopoetic theory of letters to be a mere result of
convention.
In essence, Aristotle’s physiological insights on the production of letters demystify the
onomatopoetic theories Plato establishes in the Cratylus, in effect dismissing any notion of a
natural, preordained, or intrinsic meanings in letters, syllables, and etymologies. Aristotle looks
at human communication holistically as the most advanced form of communication on a
spectrum with other animals.82 Although we have now seen how Aristotle classifies human
language, we must view how Aristotle views human anatomy and abilities when compared to
other animals. In the final section of this chapter, we will see how Aristotle further demystifies
human language by placing humans on a spectrum with other animals in terms of sound (ψόφος),
voice (φωνή), and speech (διάλεκτον) production.
II.2.3 Discourse as a Biological Classification
In the first book of Historia Animalium, Aristotle first classifies the lowest-form of
animals with regard to speech to be the noise-emitting (ψοφητικά) animals. Aristotle treats the
ability to produce noise (ψοφός), voice (φωνή), and even discourse (διάλεκτον) as merely a
series of biological classifications:
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καὶ τὰ μὲν ψοφητικά, τὰ δὲ ἄφωνα, τὰ δὲ φωνήεντα, καὶ τούτων τὰ
μὲν διάλεκτον ἔχει τὰ δὲ ἀγράμματα, καὶ τὰ μὲν κωτίλα τὰ δὲ
σιγηλὰ, τὰ δ’ ᾠδικὰ τὰ δ᾽ἄνῳδα · πάντων δὲ κοινὸν τὸ περὶ τὰς
ὀχείς μάλιστα ᾄδειν καὶ λαλεῖν (HA, 488a32-488b2).
And some are sound-producing (ψοφητικά), others are withoutvoice (ἄφωνα), others are endowed with voice (φωνήεντα), and
there are some that have the capacity for discourse (διάλεκτον ἔχει
but others are inarticulate (ἀγράμματα), and some are chattering
and others are silent; some are melodic and others are not;_— 83
This opening immediately sets up a biological hierarchy, with the lower animals being only
sound-producing (ψοφητικά), the more advanced animals having the ability to produce voice
(φωνήεντα), and the highest animals, humans alone, having the capacity of discourse (διάλεκτον
ἔχει). Aristotle attributes this classification to the anatomical limits inherent in certain animals.
Specifically, he clarifies:
φωνὴ καὶ ψόφος ἕτερόν ἐστι, καὶ τρίτον τούτων διάλεκτος. φωνεῖ
μὲν οὖν οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων μορίων οὐδέν πλὴν τῷ φάρυγγι · διὸ ὅσα
μὴ ἔχει πνεύμονα οὐδὲ φθέγγεται · διάλεκτος δ᾽ἡ τῆς φωνῆς ἐστι τῇ
γλώττῃ διάρθρωσις. τὰ μὲν οὖν φωνήεντα ἡ φωνὴ καὶ ὁ λάρυγξ
ἀφίησιν, τὰ δ᾽ἄφωνα ἡ γλῶττα καὶ τὰ χείλη · ἐξ ὧν ἡ διάλεκτός ἐστιν
(HA, 535α28-535b3).
Voice (φωνὴ) differs from sound (ψόφος), and speech (διάλεκτος)
from both. Now the only part of the body with which any animal can
utter a voice is the pharynx; hence those that have no lung have no
voice either. Speech (διάλεκτος) is the articulation (διάρθρωσις) of
the voice by means of the tongue (γλώττῃ). Now vowel sounds are
produced by the voice and the larynx; consonantal sounds by the
tongue and the lips; and of these speech consists.84
There are some animals that produce sound (ψόφος) (lowest), some that produce voice (φωνή),
and others that can engage in discourse (διάλεκτον). An animal’s classification in this scheme
depends on its powers of expression. For instance, Aristotle provides specific examples of
animal species that fall into each of these categories. For animals which only have the anatomy
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to produce sound (ψόφος) but not voice (lowest form), Aristotle states that insects fit these
criteria since they have neither “voice nor speech” on account lacking a pharynx, windpipe, and
respiratory system required for a voice (φωνή) (HA 535b4-9; DA 420b15-30). Instead, insects
can buzz, like bees and flies, or emit noise like the cicada (HA 535b4-9). Above this rank are the
animals with the abilities to produce sound and voice. Among various mammals, Aristotle lists
dolphins as a foremost animal that can produce both sound (ψόφος) and voice (φωνή). Dolphins
possess both lungs and a windpipe but do not have a free-moving tongue with which to articulate
anything in discourse or speech (διάλεκτον) (535b30).85 While these animals may have tongues
that they can control, Aristotle notes that they are much more fastened down and solid compared
to human tongues (PA 660b3, 660a31). Interestingly, Aristotle lists birds as being above the
dolphins and mammals, citing them as one of the most similar and perhaps closest species to
humans in speech abilities. Birds have a voice and a tongue with which to articulate and even
seemingly communicate to other birds during mating seasons with their songs (HA 536a20-26).
Moreover, birds, Aristotle thinks, communicate with each other during times other than breeding,
such as before fighting and when in peril (535a20-32). Despite the abilities of birds, humans are
unique with our possession of speech which, consequently, implies the possession of a voice (HA
536b3-4).
However, Aristotle’s Greek is quite perplexing on this issue. For Aristotle seems to imply
that birds or, rather, any being with the proper anatomy of a tongue, windpipe, and lungs can
communicate if it has the proper spirit (πνεῦμα) with which to do so as well (HA 535b3-5; DA
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420b5).86 However, πνεῦμα, in addition to meaning spirit, also means breath.87 An animal can
produce such noises only if it has not only the spirit, or animating force with which to act, but
also the breath with which to operate its respiratory organs. For example, while corpses may
have all the anatomy with which to produce speech, they cannot do so if there is not a spirit or
breath with which to do so. However, a reasonable question arises regarding the distinctness of
human speech: what distinguishes it from other forms of animal communication? From these
passages, it almost seems like birds can communicate with one another like humans. However,
Aristotle explicitly notes that human communication is quite different and is possessed only by
humans (διάλεκτον…ἴδιον τουτ᾽ ἀνρθώπου ἐστίν)(HA 536b2-3). The main distinction between
the animals, in addition to physiological and anatomical differences seems to extend to
functional or applicative differences in expression as well.88
Just as there is a natural hierarchy among the animals able to produce (ψόφος), voice
(φωνή), and speech (διάλεκτον), so too is there a hierarchy established on a functional basis. By
functional, I mean that Aristotle distinguishes these animals by what they are able to
communicate with their abilities to produce noise. This is clarified explicitly in an extended
passage not in his biological texts but in the Politics:
And why man is a political animal in a greater measure than any bee
or any gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as we declare, does
nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses
speech (λόγον). The mere voice (φωνή), it is true, can indicate pain
and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well
（for their nature has been developed so far as to have sensations of
what is painful and pleasant and to indicate those sensations to one
another), but speech (λόγος) is designed to indicate the
advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the
wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction from the
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other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right
and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these
things that makes a household and a city-state (1253a9-17).89
Instead of using διάλεκτον to indicate human speech, as he does in Historia Animalium, Aristotle
instead uses λόγος instead. This seems to raise a problem in interpretation. Specifically, does
Aristotle view διάλεκτον or λόγος as the unique feature of human language? I answer that
Aristotle seems to use διάλεκτον and λόγος rather interchangeably in these contexts.90 However,
Aristotle nevertheless seems to privilege humans having λόγος rather than any other being. This
διάλεκτον or λόγος for humans is far more advanced than the mere animal abilities of voice since
human communication can do more than merely indicate pain or pleasure with groans or moans,
respectively. Human λογός/διάλεκτον extends beyond the mere indication of physical sensation,
which animals are bound to have as their primary faculty.91 The human ability to communicate
qualities like justice and injustice, right and wrong, and other abstract ideas, in addition to
sensations allows humans to surpass the limits that all animals have in their linguistic abilities. In
Generation of Animals, Aristotle summarizes this idea:
For nature (φύσις) has given them (humans) this faculty in an
exceptional degree because they alone among the animals use the
voice (φωνήν) for rational speech (τοῦ δἐ λόγου) of which the voice
(φωνήν) is the “material” (GA 786b20-22).92
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As a result, we can demonstrate the hierarchical nature of Aristotle’s division of the biological
abilities of sound, voice, and speech-production:

(διάλεκτον/λόγος) Beings
with the ability of
discourse [humans]
(φωνήεντα) Beings
Endowed with Voice
[mammals]
(ψοφητικά) SoundProducing [e.g. Insects
and Fish]
(ἄφωνα) Voice/SoundLess Beings [e.g. Plants,
Rocks]

With this chart, we can ultimately see how Aristotle views humans, animals, and all beings on a
spectrum, distinguished by the complexities of their sound, voice, or speech-producing
capacities.93
§II.3.1 Summary of Chapter II
By looking at both Plato and Aristotle’s understanding of the constituent elements of
names, we can see an overarching thematic difference in both thinkers’ respective philosophies.
More specifically, Plato ultimately concludes the Cratylus by ascribing the only true, correct
knowledge of names to be learned from studying the forms of things themselves. In addition,
Plato’s extended focus throughout the dialogue on the primordial name-givers, naturalism of
etymologies, and onomatopoetic meaning of letters seem to imply his ascription of onomastic
origins to a mythical cause of meaning in language and thus a more ideal sense of names.
Aristotle’s biological focus on names, on the contrary, provides a more demythologized account
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of human language, specifically by placing humans on a spectrum with the animals and other
beings.94 Names, similarly, are resultant of biological processes and convention (κατὰ
συνθήκην). However, names are used for the sake of rational expression (λόγος), and serves to
achieve this end of reason, the highest and most distinguished human end that no other animal
shares. As a result, we find in Aristotle an overture that focuses more primarily on such
philosophical questions issues in terms of human experiences and more empirical phenomena, as
opposed to a more mythic, extra-ordinary explanations of ideas.
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Chapter III: Ontology of Names
Up to this point, we have seen how Plato and Aristotle differ with regard to the origin and
the supposed structure of names, both which have highlighted fundamental differences in their
own philosophies. In this final chapter, we will see the different ways Aristotle and Plato
understand the ontological significance of names and how this difference provides clarity on how
both thinkers conceive of the relationship of names and knowledge epistemologically. In this
chapter, we will see how Aristotle and Plato treat names in an ontological sense. That is, we shall
be investigating how Plato conceives of names in light of his theory of forms and how Aristotle’s
understanding of being shapes his own view of names. Thereafter, we will be able to ascertain
how each thinker understands the relationship between knowledge and naming , for each
thinker’s ontological understanding of names is inherently intertwined with their respective
epistemology of names. Understanding how each thinker conceives of names ontologically will
then clarify the exact kinds of knowledge which names can provide.

§III.1.1 Plato’s Turn from Names to Forms Epistemologically and Ontologically in the
Conclusion of the Cratylus
As we found in chapter II, Plato shifts the Cratylus from a discussion of names to an
examination of why the forms ought to be studied instead of names. In this section, we will
explore this point by examining Plato’s epistemological understanding of names and forms. We
can then connect Plato’s epistemology in the Cratylus to a parallel discussion on epistemology in
the Republic: the analogy of the Divided Line.
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In the previous chapter, we discussed how Socrates ultimately concedes to Hermogenes
that, despite his extensive arguments to the contrary, conventionalism must have some import on
the nature of names (435b-c). What follows this concession is Socrates raising a question
concerning whether names have any utility at all in investigations (435c-d). While Cratylus
contends that knowledge of a name necessarily entails knowledge of its referent, Socrates
opposes Cratylus’ view (Ibid.). To Cratylus, the perfect encapsulation of the form in the name’s
constituent letters and syllables would provide all the clarity necessary for understanding the
referent, as they found in the etymological section of the dialogue.95 Socrates provides a
threefold refutation of Cratylus’ adherence to naturalism since conventionalism must maintain
some role in name formation. Understanding these refutations will lead us directly into Plato’s
epistemology and the Divided Line:
I.) Names, even those handed down by the name-givers, may be
incorrect.
II.) These names are only likenesses of the forms they reference and
are therefore imperfect.96
III.) If knowledge of the names provides us a complete
understanding of the form, then why does the etymology of
ἐπιστήμη not reflect the unchanging nature of perfect knowledge ?
I.) For this first point, Socrates demonstrates that, evidently, these name-givers had to
look to the perfect form to encode it into the word; this process could have happened incorrectly,
thereby causing a sequence of events whereby each subsequent word stemming from or built
upon a primary word would then be incorrect (438a-b). Even if the name-givers had perfectly
represented the εἶδος in the name, the centuries of morphological changes would cause their
original meanings to become opaque and even false.97 Moreover, Cratylus operates on the
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assumption that names are the foremost way of learning about forms and inquiring into
phenomena; however, Socrates notes that, regardless of how primordial these name-givers were,
they still, at some point, had to look to a form for reference:98
SO: What names did he learn or discover those things from? After
all, the first names had not yet been given. Yet it’s impossible, on
our b view, to learn or discover things except by learning their names
from others or discovering them for ourselves?
CR You have a point there, Socrates.
SO: So, if things cannot be learned except from their names, how
can we possibly claim that the name-givers or rule-setters had
knowledge before any names had been given for them to know?
CR: I think the truest account of the matter, Socrates, is that a more
than human power gave the first names to things, so that they are
necessarily correct (438b-c).
Cratylus tries to save his position by contending that the gods or some “more than human power”
first granted names to humans. However, he ultimately has to concede that Socrates is correct to
look to forms because even this extemporaneous appeal to the gods cannot resolve the greater
issue between the conventionalism and the naturalism theses (438c-d). If the gods were
supposedly the ones who set forth perfect names that fully embodied the form of their referents,
then there would be no room for conventionalism, which would make the names contingent upon
circumstance. As a result, Cratylus’ own admission on the possible error of the name-givers
undermines his naturalism thesis.99 Moreover, this admission of the possible fallibility of
likeness of the forms leads, ultimately, to Socrates’ second rebuttal: names are only likenesses
and therefore inferior to the original form.
II.) Regarding this second point, Socrates states the following:
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SOCRATES: So if it’s really the case that one can learn about things
through names and that one can also learn about them through
themselves, which would be the better and clearer way to learn about
them? Is it better to learn from the likeness both whether it itself is
a good likeness and also the truth it is a likeness of? Or is it better
to learn from the truth both the truth itself and also whether the
likeness of it is properly made?
CRATYLUS: I think it is certainly better to learn from the truth
(438e-439a).100
Regardless of the supposed accuracy with which the name-setters captured the form in the
name’s letters and syllables, the name, regardless of whether it is correct, is still merely an
imitation of the form and, therefore, inferior to the referent’s form.101 Plato ultimately then views
the name as but a “proxy” for the original referent.102 Socrates asserts that they must necessarily
go to the forms themselves since names seem to change like a kind of “vortex” (δίνην) or storm,
subject to the shifting vicissitudes of time. Since true knowledge is always of what is eternal,
names only provide a kind of knowledge akin to perceptions, possibly contradicting themselves
and changing over the course of time, thereby making them an ultimately inferior means of
acquiring knowledge than the form.103
III.) For the last refutation, Socrates contends that knowledge itself cannot be through
names on account of the nature of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) itself. To this end, Socrates,
interestingly, appeals to an etymological argument, much like earlier in the dialogue:
SOCRATES: Of those we discussed, let’s reconsider the name
‘ἐπιστήμη’ (‘knowledge’) first and see how ambiguous it is. It
seems to signify that it stops (ἵστησιν) the movement of our soul
towards (ἐπί) things, rather than that it accompanies them in their
100
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movement [...]I think one could find many other names from
which one could conclude that the name-giver intended to signify
not that things were moving and being swept along, but the
opposite, that they were at rest (437a, 437c).
If the etymology of the word would provide the exact, perfect knowledge of the form that exactly
corresponds to its perfection, then Cratylus’ argument would be true. However, even the
etymology of the name for knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) does not accurately reflect the unchanging
nature of true knowledge but indicates its very opposite.104 It may seem odd that, despite refuting
Cratylus’ naturalism thesis, Socrates is applying a naturalistic argument by citing etymologies;
however, Socrates only dismisses etymologies insofar as they are used as the sole source of
knowledge. He believes that they can nevertheless clarify the thought-processes with which these
name-setters put forth the original names, thereby providing clarity about and direction toward
the form itself.105 Since an investigation of a name already leads back to the form of the very
referent, it behooves one to study the form itself since the name could have been encoded
improperly into language or has changed fundamentally over time due to conventional
differences.
With each one of these refutations, we see a repetitive pattern emerge which ultimately
leads back to the same source: forms. The unchanging nature of forms ensures their endurance
beyond the vicissitudes of a name’s conventionality, the possible human error of the namesetters, and rules any name to be a mere imitation. Plato’s repetitive insistence on the forms as
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the best sources for knowledge in the Cratylus corresponds to his most famous discussion of
epistemology and kinds of knowledge: the Analogy of the Divided Line.106 In this next section,
we will see how the Divided Line and the Cratylus contain evident similarities in their
epistemologies. The ontological inferiority of names, as we will soon ascertain, parallels Plato’s
view of the epistemological inferiority of names to the forms.

III.1.2 Names and Plato’s Divided Line
Plato’s concluding understanding of names and knowledge in the Cratylus is strikingly
similar to how he conceives of images in his analogy of the Divided Line in Book VI of the
Republic. More specifically, names, on account their ontological inferiority to forms and their
transitoriness, make them no different than imagination (εἰκασία) on the divided line.
To understand the Divided Line in context, we must first understand Plato’s preceding
analogy in the Republic: the analogy of the sun. Socrates and Glaucon discuss the nature of
sensual knowledge, specifically sight when Socrates suggests:
SO: Sight may be present in the eyes, and the one who has it may
try to use it, and colors may be present in things, but unless a third
kind of thing is present, which is naturally adapted for this very
purpose, you know that sight will see nothing, and the colors will
remain unseen.
GL: What kind of thing do you mean?
SO: I mean what you call light.
GL: You’re right.
SO: Then it isn’t an insignificant kind of link that connects the sense
of sight and the power to be seen – it is a more valuable link than
any other linked things have got, if indeed light is something
valuable (Rep. VI.507e-508a).107
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Just as the sun illuminates the world for the senses, so too do the forms, specifically the “Form of
the Good,” illuminate the world of intelligible beings.108 The Form of the Good is what enables
people to gain knowledge of beings while it is, itself, an attainable form of knowledge (Rep. 508e).
The Form of the Good’s ability to separate, distinguish, and make the intelligible, sensible world
familiar to us as knowledge implies the Form of the Good’s superiority to all other kinds of
knowledge since all other things are and are known through it.109 After comparing the sun to the
Form of the Good, Socrates proceeds to apply this epistemological thinking into his divided line
analogy:
SO: Understand, then, that, as we said, there are these two things,
one sovereign of the intelligible kind and place, the other of the
visible [...] In any case, you have two kinds of things, visible and
intelligible.
GL: Right.
SO: It is like a line divided into two unequal section. Then divide
each section – namely, that of the visible and that of the intelligible
– in the same ratio as the line. In terms now of relative clarity and
opacity, one subsection of the visible consists of images. And by
images I mean, first ,shadows [...] and everything of that sort, if you
understand (509d-510a).
Utilizing the analogy of the sun, Plato establishes a hierarchy of the kinds of knowledge in order
of superiority. The visible things immediate to the senses are below the intelligible things
immediate to the mind. Plato then breaks down this twofold division further with two subcategories
for both visible and intelligible things. For the intelligible world, Plato contends that understanding
(νόησις) is the very highest, while thinking (διάνοια) is second.110 In the visible section below,
Plato splits, in order of superiority, both belief (πίστις) and images (εἰκασία) apart.111 Using this
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information, we can therefore compare the hierarchy of knowledge espoused both here in the
Republic and in the Cratylus as well:

Analogy
of the
Divided
Line

Understanding (νόησις)
Thinking (διάνοια)

Belief (πίστις)
Images (εἰκασία)

Hierarchy
of
Knowledge
in the
Cratylus

The Forms (εἰδότες)

Perishable, Changing Things & Names
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With these diagrams, we can ultimately see how the progression of the Cratylus seems to ascend
the divided line epistemologically as well.113 Socrates first examines the opinions on names with
Hermogenes and Cratylus’ views of names. Thereafter, he turns his inquiry to understanding and
thinking through the names before finally ascertaining the very forms on which names depend.
The Cratylus almost follows the exact progression of the divided line on account of how the
dialogue develops in these ways.114 In the Divided Line, we see a more complete vision of
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Platonic epistemology with Plato suggesting four kinds of knowledge and not simply the twofold
view of particular and universal knowledge we find in the Cratylus.115
Moreover, in the two higher sections of the divided line, Smith suggests that these are
predicated on knowledge as "the cognitive power at work” whereas the lower levels are
predicated merely on vision and opinion.116 In the sense of the divided line, names, much like in
the Cratylus, are only visible signs indicative of other beings, much like an image of a shadow is
dependent on the tree which casts it. Moreover, much like opinions, whose correctness stems
from convention or individual thinking, names are similarly predicated upon such an
everchanging modality. Names are therefore only at the bottom of this epistemological and
cognitive ladder, thereby being mere images.117 Of course, names can point to a referent that
partakes in the form of the being itself; however, since the name must necessarily accord with
convention names are but a stepping-stone to the real, eternal knowledge of the forms themselves
through νοήσις.118 As a result, Plato's attitude on the epistemological value of names is quite
dismissive, especially at the conclusion of the Cratylus, for Socrates, in his penultimate remark
to Cratylus, states:
ὐδὲ πάνυ νοῦν ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου ἐπιτρέψαντα ὀνόμασιν αὑτὸν καὶ
τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχὴν θεραπεύειν, πεπιστευκότα ἐκείνοις καὶ τοῖς
θεμένοις αὐτά, διισχυρίζεσθαι ὥς τι εἰδότα (440c2-3)
But surely no one with any understanding will commit himself or
the cultivation of his soul to names, or trust them and their givers to
the point of firmly stating that he knows something.
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Scorates’ sentiment here is nearly identical with Plato’s remarks on names and epistemology in
the Seventh Letter, remarking that those using names will never acquire a full knowledge of any
form or essence on account of the inherent “deficiency of language” (διὰ τὸ τῶν λόγων ἀσθενές)
(342e).119 Much like Wittgenstein at the end of his Tractatus, Plato’s arguments on names all
seem to culminate with the idea that, once one has ascertained true knowledge of the forms to
which names point, one will then "throw away the ladder [the name] after he has climbed up
it.”120
III.1.3 Summary of Plato’s Epistemological and Ontological Dismissal of Names
With the conclusion of his Cratylus, we can more thoroughly ascertain how Plato
dismisses names in both an ontological sense and in an epistemological sense. Plato sees the
forms as the pinnacle of being with true, eternal knowledge only possible of them, thereby
making the name, a likeness of a form, superfluous since it is inherently imperfect.
As we will soon see, Aristotle not only conceives of names in a differing ontological
manner by focusing on their inherent οὐσία, but also contends that names are an integral part of
scientific knowledge on account of their role in the formation of sentences, certain kinds of
which make up a proposition or premise in syllogisms. In the following section, we will develop
how Aristotle considers names. However, before we examine Aristotle’s view on names in
scientific demonstrations, we will first contextualize how Aristotle understands and diverges
from Plato with regard to the ontological importance of names.
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§II.2.1 Aristotle on the Multiplicity of Names
Aristotle’s departure from Plato regarding the ontology of names occurs in the way he
understands forms and knowledge. Famously, Aristotle offers a summary of Plato’s position at
the conclusion of the Cratylus in the first book of his Metaphysics. In this section of chapter III,
we will see how Aristotle’s understanding of being fundamentally informs his ontological
understanding of names and, consequently, his epistemological views on names. To this end, we
will first examine how Aristotle understands the connection between name and being in contrast
to Plato. Aristotle’s ontology of names will lead us directly into his own epistemology of names.
As a result, we can then gain a better sense of how Aristotle, much like we saw in chapters one
and two, offers a more grounded view of names.
To begin, Aristotle actually provides a summary of the situation Socrates faces at the end
of the Cratylus in the sixth chapter of the first book of the Metaphysics. Regarding Plato,
Aristotle writes:
For having become acquainted from youth first with Cratylus and
the Heraclitean teachings that all sensible things are always in flux
and that there is no knowledge of them, he also conceived these
things that way later on. [...] Socrates...was the first to be skilled at
thinking about definitions, [and] Plato, when he adopted this, took
it up as applying to other things and not to sensible ones, because
of this: it was impossible that there be any common definition of
any perceptible thing since they were always changing. So he
called this other sort of beings forms, and said the perceptible
things were apart from these and all spoken derivatively from
these, for the many things with the same names as the forms were
results of participation (987a-987b).121
For Plato, everything fundamentally participates in being like or seeming like its perfect form but
is nevertheless separate from it. Although Aristotle here seems to discuss the Platonic theory of
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forms with regard to physical phenomena, his insights nevertheless reflect the conclusions of the
Cratylus as well. There, Plato treats words in a manner strikingly similar to physical phenomena
in claiming that they are particular and therefore imperfect. After briefly summarizing Plato,
Aristotle diverts from Plato in suggesting that the form fundamentally exists in every being and
not simply as some abstract entity (Met. Α.991b). Similarly, in the Physics, Aristotle notes that
forms and ideas such as the beautiful, the good, or the just are wrongfully abstracted to the world
of the purely ideal (Phys. 194a). Moreover, Aristotle notes that in each particular material thing,
there is in fact a form inherent within that thing. This idea, that a form is apparent in the
manifestation of every particular, material phenomena also coincides with his idea of telos
(τέλος) (Phys. 198α).122 Since the form is the perfect actualization of a something, its τέλος
fundamentally acts towards that end in every being (Phys. 198b). Now that we have
distinguished how Aristotle conceives of form and matter as being inherently inextricable from
each other in anything as one, we can thereby then apply this understanding to Aristotle’s
understanding of words in De Interpretatione and Metaphysics.

III.2.2 Aristotle on Names Being Thinghoods (οὐσίαι) Restricted in Being by Definitions
(ὁρισμοί)
As we saw in chapter 1, Aristotle understands a name (ὄνομα), in De Interpretatione, to
be a symbol for an affection in the soul (πάθημα ἐν τῇ φωνῇ) that is fundamentally the same
impression of a phenomena for all people (ταὐτὰ πᾶσι). This affection in the soul actualizes in
words and languages differently across localities.123 Ontologically, Aristotle understands names
quite similarly, for he contends that although there are infinitely many ways to express
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something such as a “apple,” the referent to which all such different names of apple refer is what
is universal (Met. Γ.1006a). Whether you refer to apple as Apfel, pomme, malum, or μῆλον, the
affection of the soul is the same for all. Moreover, each of these words refer to the same being.
The reason why each of these words refer to the same being is because they all have the same
definition. Aristotle notes that definition is an inherent necessity in words since, without
definition, it would be impossible for there to be any communication because we would have no
idea what we meant when using words (Met. Γ.1006b). It is important that we note, however,
what we mean by “definition.” Definition is translated from the Greek ὀρισμός which is an
abstract nominal form of the verb ὀρίζω, meaning to restrict or bound.124 A definition of a being
allows for a finite meaning to be unveiled with the utterance or articulation (λόγος) of the name
(ὄνομα) and, with this restriction in being, ultimately reveal the thinghood (οὐσία).125 A name
(ὄνομα) is therefore an articulation (λόγος) with a definition (ὀρισμός). In not only his
Metaphysics, but also in his logical Posterior Analytics and Topics, Aristotle contends that these
definitions are a necessity for the sciences and must be unambiguous and universal (An. Post. I.4,
Top. I.15).126 However, not every kind of word is similarly defined since we have varying kinds
of words in language such as adjectives, conjunctions, modifiers, and verbs among many others.
In the Metaphysics, definitions only extend to referents which are thinghoods (οὐσίαι) in the
world or simple names (Ζ.1030b4-6). We therefore need to answer then why the definition
extends merely to names of these primary thinghoods in language. To answer this, we must
proceed to how Aristotle conceives of the relationship between being and language as a whole.
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III.2.3 Thinghoods (οὐσιαί) are only one of the Categories (κατηγορίαι) of Being
Famously, Aristotle contends that τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχώς or that “being is said in many
ways,” but what exactly does this mean?127 This may be read, at least in part, as Aristotle
asserting that other philosophers or thinkers have discussed being in a multivaried way and that
he is merely citing the ἔνδοξα of past thinkers.128 However, in these contexts, Aristotle is
asserting that being is evidently“signified” through the multivaried ways in which we speak.129
Aristotle’s Greek provides a clearer explanation. For example:
καθ᾽ αὑτὰ δὲ εἶναι λέγεται ὅσαπερ σημαίνει τὰ σχήματα τῆς
κατηγορίας: ὁσαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται, τοσαυταχῶς τὸ εἶναι
σημαίνει. ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν [25] κατηγορουμένων τὰ μὲν τί ἐστι
σημαίνει, τὰ δὲ ποιόν, τὰ δὲ ποσόν, τὰ δὲ πρός τι, τὰ δὲ ποιεῖν ἢ
πάσχειν, τὰ δὲ πού, τὰ δὲ ποτέ, ἑκάστῳ τούτων τὸ εἶναι ταὐτὸ
σημαίνει (Met. Δ.7.23-27).
But just as many things are said to be in their own right as are
meant by the modes of predication; for in as many ways as these
are said, in so many ways does to be have meaning. Since, then,
of things predicated, some signify what a thing is, others of what
sort it is, others how much it is, others to what is related, others
what it is doing or having dones to it, others where it is, and others
when it is, being means the same thing as each one of these.130
Being is therefore signified in as many ways as there are “modes of predication.” It is critical to
note that Sachs translates κατηγορίας as “modes of predication.” Κατηγορία, literally meaning
“accusation,” is a nominal form of the compound Greek verb, κατηγορέω, whose constituent
prefix κατα and verb ἀγορέυω literally mean “to speak against” or, in logical works, “to
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predicate upon.”131, 132 Whenever we communicate anything through any kind of word, we
fundamentally do so in a way that predicates being onto the referent in one of these ways of
attributing being, regardless of the word being an adjective, article, noun, or verb. These “ways”
of attributing being are present not only here in the Metaphysics, but also are more exhaustively
stated in Aristotle’s Categories133:
τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἤτοι οὐσίαν
σημαίνει ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποὺ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ κεῖσθαι ἢ ἔχειν
ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν (Cat. 1b25).
Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance
(οὐσία), quantity (ποσὸν), quality (ποιὸν), relation (πρός τι), place
(ποὺ), time (ποτὲ), position (κεῖσθαι), state, action (ποιεῖν) ,or
affection (πάσχειν).134
Although the Categories is a work of logic in the Organon, we find ample evidence that
Aristotle similarly understands being as predicated in as many ways as there are categories (Μet.
Δ.7).135 Nevertheless, despite the multiplicity of these categories of being, Aristotle emphasizes
that they are not at all equal. In fact, Aristotle asserts, in both the Categories and the
Metaphysics, that thinghood (οὐσία) is evidently foremost among all of these categories since
without the presence of thinghood, it would be impossible to conceive of any of the other
categories by themselves:
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Τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένων λέγεται τῶν πρώτων
οὐσιῶν ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν [...] Ἔτι αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι
διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὑποκεῖσθαι (15) καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ
τούτων κατηγορεῖσθαι ἢ ἐν ταύταις εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα οὐσίαι
λέγονται. (Cat. 2a34-36;2b15-18).
Everything except primary substance (oὐσία) is either predicable of
a primary substance of present in a primary substance [...] Moreover,
primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of
the fact that they are the entities which underlie everything else.136
The category of thinghood (οὐσία) fundamentally underlies each utterance. Aristotle uses the
example of the adjective “white” to demonstrate that every quality (ποιόν), for instance, shows
that the idea of “whiteness” cannot be understood without reference to a kind of underlying
surface or thinghood of another being.137 Other words such as three, adjacent, night, and running
all correspond to the categories of quantity, relation, time, and action, for example, and all
necessitate the present of a thinghood. We can therefore understand the categories of being in a
hierarchy with all categories being evidently dependent on thinghood (οὐσία):

Thinghood
(οὐσία)
Quantity
(ποσόν)

Quality
(ποιόν)

Relation
(πρός τι)

Place
(πού)

Time
(ποτέ)

Position
(κεῖσθαι)

State

Action
(ποιεῖν)

Affection
(πάσχειν)

Having understood Arisotle’s conception of thinghood as a name whose articulation (λόγος) is a
definition (ὀρισμός) restricting its being, thereby revealing both the matter and the form of the
name, we can proceed to understand how Aristotle conceives of the connection between names
and knowledge.
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III.2.4 The Primacy of Thinghood
Aristotle repeatedly notes that being is ascertained foremost through thinghood
(οὐσία).138 Similarly, Aristotle notes that thinghood is foremost in knowledge as well.
Thinghood, therefore, is something foremost both ontologically and epistemologically.
Referencing the other categories of being, Aristotle explicitly notes:
and we believe that we know each thing most of all when we know
what it is – a human being or fire – rather than of what sort or how
much or where it is, since we know even each of these things
themselves only when we know what an amount or a sort is
(Z.1028a38-1028b3).
When we know the name of a primary thinghood such as “apple,” “cat,” or “pencil,” we
evidently have a definition whose restriction answers the question τί ἐστί or “what is it?”139 In
addition to knowing what something is through its thinghood (οὐσία), Aristotle also believes
that asking what the being of something (τί τὸ ὄν) is akin to asking, “what is thinghood”
(τίς ἡ οὐσία)?140 In addition to what something is, Aristotle contends that names, in their very
definition, express “what-it-is-for-something-to-be” or a τὸ τὶ ἢν εἶναι, traditionally translated as
“essence.”141 With these two components, the name of an οὐσία therefore informs us not only
what something it, but also formally what it means for the referent to be what it is. We cannot
have a name of something such as an apple, water bottle, or bread without the very thinghood
being manifest primarily. Adjectives such as “blue,” “lazy,” or “ugly” cannot be understood
without reference to some definite oὐσία. The name, ultimately, is a kind of instantiation of the
underlying thinghood to which it refers.142
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Since a name is a definitive οὐσία, restricted in being, and is foremost among the senses
of being, the thinghood of something, to which the name refers, is therefore foremost in our
knowledge since it is expressive of what something is (Μet. Z.1028a-b). As we will soon see,
names are also indispensable component of propositions in logic, the framework upon which
demonstrative knowledge via syllogisms is conveyed, expressed, and understood. Aristotle
expresses this in the Metaphysics quite explicitly:
ὥστε, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, πάντων ἀρχὴ ἡ οὐσία: ἐκ γὰρ
τοῦ τί ἐστιν οἱ συλλογισμοί εἰσιν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ αἱ γενέσεις
(Ζ.10.1034a31-34).
Therefore, just as in demonstrative reasoning (syllogisms),
thinghood (οὐσία) is the source of everything; for syllogisms come
from what something is, while here generations do.
Syllogisms, constructed of propositions, require names in their subjects and constructions for
scientific knowledge. Before we can understand how names (ὀνόματα) are essential for
propositions and, consequently, scientific knowledge, we must first clarify in what scientific
knowledge consists. Aristotle asserts, in his Nicomachean Ethics for example, that scientific
knowledge is merely one of the five “virtues of thought:” ἐπιστήμη (“scientific knowledge”),
τεχνή (“craft knowledge”), φρονήσις (“prudence”), σοφία (“wisdom”), and understanding
(νοῦς).143In Posterior Analytics, Aristotle explains scientific knowledge in this way:
Our contention now is that we do at any rate obtain knowledge by
demonstration. By demonstration (ἀποδείψεως) I mean a syllogism
(συλλογισμόν)
which
produces
scientific
knowledge
(ἐπιστημονικόν), in other words one which enables us to know
(ἐπιστάμεθα) by the mere fact that we grasp it. Now if knowledge is
such as we have assumed, demonstrative knowledge
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(ἀποδεικτικήν ἐπιστήμην), must proceed from premises which are
true, primary, immediate, better known than, prior to, and causative
of the conclusion.144
Scientific knowledge is therefore a demonstrative kind of knowledge: proven, necessary, and
true by the implementation of truthful premises. These premises, in a syllogism, fundamentally
reveal an aspect of a subject by showing it in its demonstration through its premises.145
Now that we have ascertained how Aristotle understands scientific knowledge, we can now
investigate the role of names in the most integral component of scientific knowledge: premises.
III.2.5 The Role of Names in Aristotle’s Demonstrative, Scientific Knowledge
To understand the role of names in the Aristotlelian science, we must examine their role
as Aristotle understands them in De Interpretatione. In De Interpretatione, Aristotle lists both
the name (ὄνομα) and the verb (ῥῆμα) as the two components inherent in a sentence or
articulation (λόγος) (De Int. 16a-16b). A sentence (λόγος), according to Aristotle, consists:
Λόγος δέ ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντική, ἧς τῶν μερῶν τι σημαντικόν ἐστι
κεχωρισμένον, ὡς φάσις ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς κατάφασις. (16b27-30).
A sentence is a significant portion of speech, some parts of which
have an independent meaning, that is to say, as an utterance,
though not as the expression of any positive judgment
(κατάφασις).146
The constituent elements of sentences (λόγοι), names (ὀνόματα) and verbs (ῥήματα), both
maintain their own separate meaning as we found previously; however, Aristotle also adds that
names and verbs are mere φάσεις (expressions or “sayables”), which do not have the ability
apparent in statements: “positive judgment” (κατάφασις). Moreover, statements are a broad
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categories of compound forms of expression, with premises only being one kind of subtype of
since there are differing kinds of sentences in other studies such as rhetoric and poetry (De Int.
17a). From here, we can begin to focus more on what makes a proposition (λόγος ἀποφαντικός)
a unique kind of sentence.
A statement becomes a proposition (λόγος ἀποφαντικός) when it is either affirmative
(κατάφασις) or negative (ἀπόφασις) of something (Ibid.,17a9-11). In order to become
affirmatory or negatory, these statements must have an existential import, whether in claiming
that something is or is not the case.147 Premises (προτάσεις), in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics,
maintain the very same function as do propositions (λόγοι ἀποφαντικοί). Aristotle states this
quite explicitly at the opening of the Prior Analytics:
Πρῶτον εἰπεῖν περὶ τί καὶ τίνος ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις, ὅτι περὶ ἀπόδειξιν
καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἀποδεικτικῆς· εἶτα διορίσαι τί ἐστι πρότασις καὶ τί
ὅρος καὶ τί συλλογισμός, καὶ ποῖοςτέλειος καὶ ποῖος ἀτελής [...]
Πρότασις μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ λόγος καταφατικὸς ἢ ἀποφατικός τινος
κατά τινος (An. Pr 24a10-13; 24a16).
Our first duty is to state the scope of our inquiry, and to what
science it pertains: that it is concerned with demonstration, and
pertains to a demonstrative science. Next we must define the
meaning of ‘premiss’ and ‘term’ and ‘syllogism,’ and distinguish
between a perfect and an imperfect syllogism [...] A premiss is an
affirmative (καταφατικὸς) or negative (ἀποφατικός) statement
of something about some subject.148
We do not need to discuss the minutiae of Aristotelian syllogisms in detail any further, for we
have, in essence, seen how names are an essential element in the premises (προτάσεις) which are
the elements inherent in the syllogisms for demonstrative knowledge (An. Post. I.3). We should
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note, however, that Aristotle asserts explicitly that proper, scientific demonstrative knowledge
can only occur proceed when the premises are all true (An. Post. I.2).
Chapter IV: Conclusion
§IV.1 The Role of Names in Plato’s Philosophy
In the previous chapters, we have seen how an understanding of names informs us of
Plato’s and Aristotle’s differences as thinkers with regard to the origin of names, elements of
names, and epistemology/ontology of names. Names provide us with a means through which not
only to see their differences in their kinds of inquiry, but also, most importantly, in their
fundamental differences in philosophical inquiry itself. In this conclusion, I will be examining
the role and priority of names in each’s own understanding of proper philosophical inquiry. In
doing so, I will be able to demonstrate each’s views on philosophy itself.
Although Plato and Aristotle recognize the necessity of names and even language for
philosophy to occur, both have quite different conceptions of what philosophy is itself. Names
are an integral component in how each thinker conceives of the method and even ends of
philosophy. For Plato, questioning what a name means is the starting point for nearly every
dialogue.149. In Aristotle, names are integral components of the first principles of philosophy, the
aim to which first philosophy, the highest form of philosophy, is aimed to contemplate.
In every extant, authentic Platonic dialogue, we find that the principle focus always
begins with either an interlocutor or Socrates questioning what the meaning of a term is. For
argument's sake, I have included the following diagram that well clarifies this point:
Platonic Dialogue
Euthyphro
Meno
149

Question
What is piety (τὸ ὅσιον)?
What is virtue (ἀρετή)

Please see the chart in the following paragraph.

Stephanus Citation
5d
70a
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Republic
Theaetetus
Sophist
Cratylus
Charmides
Laches
Lysis

What is justice (δικαιοσύνη)?
What is knowledge
(ἐπιστήμη)?
What is being (τὸ ὄν)?
What is the correctness of
names (ὀρθότητα ὀνόματα)?
What is temperance
(σωφροσύνη)?
What is courage (ἀνδρεία)?
What is friendship (φιλία)?

357d, 433a
146e
244b
383a
159b
194e
212a-b

In every single one of these dialogues, questioning the name is the beginning of the
philosophical dialogue, in addition to earnest wondering at the meaning and nature of the term.150
By questioning the names through statements (λόγοι), the interlocutors, and even the readers, are
able to witness the development of the ideas, opinions, and definitions expressed in the dialogue.
The dialogue exhibits Plato’s view on how philosophy is truly to develop. Philosophy, for
Plato, is a dynamic process that cannot be conveyed through dogmatic statements but, instead,
must proceed through the exchanges of discourse. However, the dialogue is not some kind play
or dramatic piece, the end of which presents his philosophical beliefs.151 We cannot turn to the
end of a Platonic dialogue to gain an answer for a question, like a mathematics textbook. Rather,
his dialogues serve to show how the philosophical endeavor is to be conducted as a whole
throughout the entirety of the dialogue.152 The word and its definition become “purified”
throughout the dialogue by becoming more clear and universal in meaning to the interlocutors;
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however, the final meanings or opinions are not an end to the study of that word, but, instead are
a propaedeutic for continued philosophical speculation.153
Philosophy must necessarily be a dynamic process of dialogical exchange on account of
the ever shifting nature of language. A common motif across several dialogues, including the
Cratylus, are admissions of the finitude of names and how they can never express the totality of
their referents.154 The written word seems like the complete and whole truth, but it, much like
any image, is incomplete and quite deceptive since readers may think that they have grasped the
totality of something.155 There is no eternal kind of language that can ever capture such extralinguistic concepts. Plato contends that no one intelligent (νοῦν ἔχων) would dare to commit
things eternally to words on account of their “feebleness” (διὰ τὸ τῶν λόγων άσθενές)(342e).
Moreover, since all writers can never convey the totality of their thought in the written word,
what we read in the written word or hear spoken is only a semblance of the author’s “most
serious ideas” that reside in his/her soul (344c). Philosophical matters are ones which require the
utmost focus and direction of the entire soul (344c-e). Therefore, the dialogue ultimately serves
as the best literary form that not only questions terms in earnest, but also presences the reader
into the philosophical discussion so that the interlocutor can think along the same path of reason
to the depths of knowledge, hopefully, as the speakers.156
In addition, however, this clarifying of name and definition at the conclusion of dialogues
are never the ends of philosophy. One cannot go to the last pages a dialogue to get the answers,
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much like a math textbook. On the contrary, the dialogue must be read in its entirety to reveal
how the differing opinions, definitions, and meanings of certain words become “purified”
throughout the dialogue’s exchange, refutation, and discussion of opinions and beliefs, thereby
paving the way for “deeper” philosophic contemplation.157 The purification of language, as a
result of reading the entirety of the dialogue, serves as the foundation for the reader to continue
philosophizing. Therefore, the purified word is a propaedeutic for continued philosophizing.
Plato’s inclusion of aporiai, or contradictions, at the conclusions of dialogues such as the
Cratylus with the conventionality-naturalism question, are also quite intentional for this same
purpose: complelling the reader to continue philosophizing.158 The dialogue is able to place such
an onus upon the reader to continue to philosophize beyond its confines.159
In short, with Plato’s dialogues and his statements in his Seventh Letter, we see how Plato
believes that names, and the earnest questioning of their meanings, are the starting point for
philosophical speculation but never the end of such thinking. There is no end, finish line, or
terminus for philosophy. Just as language changes over the currents of time, so too must we
continue to maneuver through its labyrinth to philosophize eternally.

§IV.2 The Role of Names in Aristotle’s First Philosophy
Unlike Plato, who seems to have used the questioning of names as a beginning to
philosophize, names seem, to Aristotle, to be a part of the ultimate ends of philosophy: first
principles. In this brief section, I will be examining Aristotle’s view on first philosophy, its ends,
and how names are evidently a critical part of those ends in first philosophy.
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First Philosophy (πρώτη φιλοσοφία) is first insofar as it refers to the kind of knowledge
(ἐπιστήμη) of the “separate and motionless” being responsible for all other beings in the world
(Met. Γ.1.1003a, Ε.1.1025b-1026b). Since philosophy is a kind of knowledge, it must have first
principles, like any of the other kinds of knowledge (Met. Γ.1005a-b). Across his logical and
biological works, Aristotle stresses the necessity of defining the first principles from which all
future conclusions are found (Post. An. 71b, Phys. 184a).160 With these principles, we are thereby
able to proceed from the most immediate, well-known things to the lesser-known things with
certainty (Phys. 184a, Met. Α.1.982b). However, first philosophy itself is inherently unlike all
other kinds of science or inquiry.
The first philosopher’s focus, according to Aristotle, is the study of being qua being or
being as a study of being or being through the lens of being (Met. Γ.1003a). All other studies or
kinds of knowledge focus on a certain part of being and already presuppose the being of what
they are studying (Ibid.). For example, mathematics is akin to being qua number since it
presupposes the being of its numbers and only examines being through the lens of number.
Similarly, biology would be being qua life since it presupposes the being of living things and
examines the world through living things. Studying being qua being is the first philosopher’s
study since it investigates the “source” and the “elements” of all being which is found in a study
of the thinghood (οὐσία) of independent beings (Γ.2.1004b16-17; Γ.3.1005a).161 Since
knowledge of the causes of things is the most satisfactory and complete form of knowledge,
understanding the cause of all being would therefore provide the highest form of knowledge
(A.2.982b). However, unlike all other sciences, first philosophy is one which is not
demonstrative since its questions are beyond all demonstrable means; however, this does not
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mean that first philosophy is beyond the realm of possible knowledge.162 There are two ways of
acquiring knowledge according to Aristotle the Metaphysics:
And yet all learning is by means of things or some of which are
already known, whether it is by means of demonstration or by way
of definitions [...] So it is clear that it belongs to the philosopher and
the one who studies all thinghood, insofar as it is by nature, to
investigate also about the starting points of demonstrative
reasoning” (Met. A.9.992b31-33, Γ.3.1005b).
Unlike the natural sciences, first philosophy is concerned with ascertaining the principles that
underlie all being, the causes of being, and the principles that are common to all inquiries. The
Principle of Non-Contradiction is the foremost example of this kind of principle, since it is both
indemonstrable, inherent in every form of inquiry, and is always assumed whenever one is
saying, writing, asserting, or even thinking anything (Met. Γ.1005a-1006b). Formulating,
thinking through, and understanding principles such as the Principle of Non-Contradiction
belong to the task of the philosopher because it ultimately exists both as a cause of why things
are independent, and applicable to being qua being (Met. Γ.1003a-1004a). These principles are a
unity composed of the words of our language into a singular account (λόγος) or definition
(ὀρισμός).163 As we saw in chapter III, Aristotle sees names as an integral component for
definitions and statements (λόγοι) in logical contexts; however, he seems to similarly view
names as necessary parts in the definitions and articulations of principles for first philosophy
(Met. Ζ.12.1038a).164 If names were not an integral part of first philosophy, why else would
Aristotle have devoted the entirety of book Δ of the Metaphysics clarifying terms and much of
book Ζ discussing the nature of λόγος and ὀρισμός (Met. Z.4.1029b-17.1041b).165
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Names provide insight into the diametrically opposing nature of both Aristotle and
Plato’s conceptions of philosophy. For Plato, questioning names is only the first step of any
philosophical inquiry while, for Aristotle, clarifying and defining names and principles are an
essential aspect of the ends of philosophy, particularly first philosophy. Both thinkers present
two worldviews and methodologies with which to question, understand, and think about all
things, with their differing ideas of names leading us to each’s views. With such an enduring
legacy into the medieval, Renaissance, modern, and now post-modern period, Aristotle and Plato
are perhaps two of history’s greatest thinkers. In this way, I think Dante was correct to place
Plato and Aristotle as foremost among all the virtuous pagan philosophers in Limbo standing
above them all, since their philosophies and insights into humanity maintain a brilliance and
originality rarely seen in recorded human history.166As with all subjects of inquiries, with regard
to language and the world, the ancients always have the first, and sometimes final, word.
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